European Migrations and Their Governments in the Context of WWII by Hall, Mikayla Paige
EUROPEAN MIGRATIONS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF WWII 
 
 
An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis  
by 
MIKAYLA PAIGE HALL 
 
 
Submitted to Honors and Undergraduate Research 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as an 
 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
 
Approved by 
Research Advisor:           Dr. Nathan Bracher 
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
Major: International Studies
 
	  TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................1 
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................................3 
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................4 
CHAPTER 
 I INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................5 
 II MILITARY AGENDAS..........................................................................................8 
  France: A Government’s Action..............................................................................8 
  Germany in Retreat ................................................................................................12 
  Similarities and Differences...................................................................................15 
 III POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ..................................................................................16 
  Politics of the Third Republic ................................................................................17 
  The Nazi Party Culture ..........................................................................................22 
  Similarities and Differences...................................................................................25 
 IV SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS....................................................................................27 
  Demographic of Migrations...................................................................................28 
  Views Towards Occupation and Invasion .............................................................30 
  Similarities and Differences...................................................................................31 
 V CONCLUSION......................................................................................................33 
  Findings and Application.......................................................................................33 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................35 
 
 
   
 
 
	   
ABSTRACT 
European Migrations and Their Governments in the Context of WWII. (May 2014) 
 
Mikayla Paige Hall 
Department of International Studies 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Nathan Bracher 
Department of International Studies 
 
“It is well known that human beings are complex, multi-faceted, contradictory, and full of 
surprises, but it takes a time of war or great upheaval in order to see it,” (Némirovsky, 363). 
When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coasts of the United States in 2005, various shades of 
human behaviors surfaced. Some people sought to help their neighbors or community by 
providing aid, while others robbed the convenience store down the street to get provisions for 
themselves or family out of panic. All of these people waited for immediate government 
assistance that, arguably, was not prepared for such a natural disaster. Crisis like natural disasters 
and war cause massive land migrations of people, leaving their homes for other regions around 
them. Unfortunately, these regions are rarely prepared for such an influx of people. Entering the 
question, “What is the government’s role in this?” 
 
A government’s action or inaction in critical situations like these means the difference in overall 
prevention of destruction. Specifically, this work will analyze how the Third Republic of France 
and the Nazi government of Germany during WWII reacted to, and relayed information to its 
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people about, the enemy forces that invaded their homelands. Nationalism, propaganda, and 
political pressures contributed to the consequential actions of the two governments in similar, yet 
differing ways. All the while, these government decrees, sanctions, and laws affect their 
respective citizens and, in turn, effectively aid the two massive migrations of people within these 
two very different countries and societies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
WWII was not a war fought solely on the battlefields, but it was incredibly present on the “home 
front,” arguably more so than any other previous war in Europe. Citizens and cities increasingly 
became tactical pivots for the opposing armies (Diamond, 11). German civilians as well as 
French civilians experienced traumatizing effects of WWII, such as unpredictable bombings, 
deportations to labor camps, and migrations away from their homes to avoid the invading 
military forces. My research will identify the similarities and differences between the migration 
of Parisians in May 1940 southward and the migration of Germans from Breslau, Silesia in 
February 1945 westward to central Germany as they are affected by their socio-political 
ideologies. My goal with this research is to magnify the similarities that thematically draw the 
two migrations together, although they are separated by five years’ time, geography, and 
ideologies. 
 
The similarities roughly equal the differences of these exoduses. Similarities include: retreating 
soldiers intermixing with fleeing civilians, trains not being able to keep up with the demands of 
the masses, people fleeing out of fear of the invading army forces as fueled by propaganda, both 
cities were considered “fortress cities,” and many evacuees from other nations filed through and 
mixed in with civilians from the two cities. The differences only exist when discussing political 
strategies of the two regimes and their cultural ideologies paired with existing social structures.  
 
One might infer that due to the Nazi regime control, all German citizens supported the regime or 
that Hitler cared for all German people. But, this was not the case, as many Germans did not take 
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Hitler’s speeches and propagandized posters seriously during the early stages of the German 
retreat. These people did not trust what their government was claiming about great victories 
being won and how “Germany is stronger than ever!” when in fact, it was at its weakest point. 
By the end of WWII, scholars have determined the total number of displaced Germans to be 
12,448,000 (Bessel, 419). Regarding Breslau alone, 18,000 of its civilians died in one week 
while fleeing the Soviet Army and another 25,000 died while the city was under attack 
(Hargreaves, vii). Nazi leaders had “urged [the Silesian population] to stand fast…in particular 
the radical Gauleiter and Reich Defence Commissar in Breslau, Karl Hanke, maintained until the 
last moment that the German population was in no immediate danger,” (Bessel, 76). Why did 
Hitler abandon his people on the Eastern front with the invading Red Army? Why weren’t the 
evacuation plans implemented earlier then they were? Did this delay have anything to do with 
their reigning political ideology?  
 
When regarding the French migration, was there an evacuation plan to follow? Was this 
evacuation more or less “civilized” than the Eastern German evacuation? Why was the timing of 
evacuation so different between the two, as the Parisians heeded the reality of inevitable 
occupation and hastily fled from Paris, but the Silesians were caught in a battle? And while the 
Parisians were given evacuation instructions by multiple blackboards posted throughout the city, 
this departure was no less chaotic than the Breslau evacuation. When transportation outlets such 
as taxis and trains were either gone, all being used already, or not running due to technical 
difficulties such as a lack of petrol, families became desperate. Interestingly, in books like Irène 
Némirovsky’s Suite Française and Hanna Diamond’s Fleeing Hitler, a few firsthand accounts of 
the Parisian exodus remark on how uncivilized this throng of people have quickly become even 
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though, “From the outset departure was intensely class-based,” and somewhat divided (Diamond, 
54). Both the Breslau evacuees and Parisian evacuees experienced death on the roads they were 
traveling, but the timing of the Breslau exodus proved detrimental. While Parisians faced a 
summer heat that “overpowered,” the people, the Silesians faced a murderous winter that literally 
froze many in their tracks.  
 
Two peoples of differing ideologies, political agendas, and social constructions are put in 
frighteningly similar conditions and are left with dramatically different results. The goal with this 
research is to find the link between the social or cultural structure of a society and the political 
agendas of regimes and in so doing, prove how this relationship is imperative to determining the 
success or failure of mobilizing a people during chaotic environments, such as war. My hope 
would be that this research could then be applied to current wartime refugee and evacuation 
trauma.
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CHAPTER II 
MILITARY AGENDAS 
When discussing the military tactics of a certain military regime, one must be aware of the 
prevailing ideology that is assumed and embedded within the military system and its leaders, as 
each regime is different from another. A look at the French and German military regime 
strategies during and leading up to WWII must be analyzed through the lens of underlying 
political motivations, the prevailing theory of ‘a nation in arms’ that exists within that nation, 
and the culture that is developed out of that nation’s military history. It would be most beneficial 
to start with the later and use the French and German military history to discuss and thus better 
understand the military culture that the respective leaders of WWII were born into, as political 
motivations and the theory of a ‘nation in arms’ effectively explain the military strategies. 
 
France: A Government’s Action 
As French military history is much involved and covers thousands of years, it’s most beneficial 
to focus on the wars that most immediately affect the actions of WWII, which are the Franco-
Prussian War and WWI. “The Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune were decisive 
factors in the history of the nation in arms,” (Challener, 31). Militarily, while there became an 
apparent need after the Franco-Prussian war that mandatory military conscription was needed to 
produce a successful army, the social implications of the 1870 defeat by the Prussians led to a 
shift in French mentality in regards to the ‘nation’ as an idea and as an institution. According to 
the reporter for the National Assembly, Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, “The war had been the 
work of Providence, which had acted so as to teach Frenchmen to do better,” (Challener, 34). 
Doing better in this case would be to build up a sizeable military army through conscription. 
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Challener discusses two ways to define a ‘nation in arms,’ one by, “the number of men under 
arms or subject to mobilization,” and the second by, “military strategies being brought in line 
with republican military theories,” (Challener, 46-47). The French military grew in size from half 
a million after 1870 to 3,500,000 by 1914.1 In this physical sense, France became a nation in 
arms rather quickly. In regards to military theories, the French military was now by 1905 viewed 
as not only a, “fighting force but as a school in which French youth acquired basic principles of 
citizenship,” (Challener, 47). Now, military thought becomes integrated into social mentality as a 
French collective body. This fostered the rebirth of a more moral and nationalistic France from 
pre-1870 mentalities, as the Third Republic is born of the defeat. Alongside of this growth in 
numbers, there is a shift in economic industry as France experiences gains and losses during and 
after the Great Depression. With France’s economic industrial growth, “stopping short of a full-
scale industrial revolution,” it did not grow with the same intensity as the economies of Britain 
or Germany (“France”). This statement serves to highlight the various conflicts within a new, 
prospering economy that is forced to coexist with traditional means of production of specialized 
goods. Traditional means of production in France include the use of specialized, skilled labor 
that was used for wine making and the production of other fine goods traditionally produced in 
France. This tradition of specialization slightly hindered France’s economy in regards to mass 
production outputs. While efforts were made to incorporate new weapons technologies, the delay 
of pursuing industrial progress can be contrasted with the rising German Empire during the same 
time period. “But by 1935 industrial production had fallen to 79 percent of the 1928 level and 
exports to 55 percent. Registered unemployment hovered at less than 500,000, but this figure 
concealed the fact that many urban workers were subsisting on family farms owned by relatives. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Statistics	  were	  taken	  by	  Challener,	  pp.	  46-­‐47,	  from	  Colonel	  Joseph	  Revol,	  Histoire	  de	  
l’armée	  française	  (Paris:	  Larousse,	  1929),	  pp.	  203-­‐04.	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Besides, the French exported much of their unemployment; thousands of immigrant workers lost 
their work permits and had to return home. Not until 1938–39 did a measure of recovery set in, 
thanks to Reynaud’s business-oriented policies plus the stimulus of rearmament. By the time war 
broke out again, France had barely returned to the pre-Depression level.” (“France”). 
 
The French military goal was not to participate in an arms race due to the prevailing ideology of 
“a nation in arms,” during the period just before 1938. The goal was to develop, “defensive 
warfare, to the exclusion of other, and possibly more fruitful, military concepts,” (Challener, 
216). In the aftermath of WWI, France’s main concern in regards to military strategy was to fix 
whatever mistakes were made, including increasing the availability and efficiency of moving 
goods and supplies to military units needing them. These highly defensive systems of action 
centered on the widely held notion by French military theorists that any eminent German attack 
would not quickly result in their victory (Challner 216). This created a smooth transition as a 
state from peace to war and from war to peace (Challener, 198). Mobilization of all government 
agencies, utilization of various transportation methods, and communication methods from 
government actors to civil authorities were key elements discussed in this strategy. This set of 
wartime measures, called the Paul-Bancour law, was constructed by the Conseil Supérieur d la 
Défense Nationale and developed by Maginot and Painlevé (Challener, 194). This law rested on 
the principle that, “in a world where war appeared to have become total, the military power of 
the nation was directly proportional to its organized economic and industrial strength,” 
(Challener, 214). Had this legislation been passed, there would have been significant attention 
turned to providing a steady flow of arms by production workers to the soldiers at the front. 
When discussing the French government’s actions and communication with its people during the 
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migration of 1939, it can be said that measures were put into place for quick, organized, and 
decisive action to be taken. This decisive action would include the mobilization of all 
government agencies; however, while some political leaders supported the use of every, 
“individual and every resource…in the defense effort,” several military leaders wanted to keep 
the separation of, “soldier and citizen,” (Challener, 210). These political leaders rested on the 
history of French civilian reserves who proved their patriotism and ability to help defend the 
country during WWI. However, these measures were not immediately put into place at the start 
of WWII because of the nine-month period that existed between September 3, 1939 and May 10, 
1940, called the Phony War. 
 
 During these months, the civilians and the military, arguably, were in a state of complacency 
resulting from an, “uncanny lack of activity on the front,” (Diamond, 25). The anticipated aerial 
attacks and bombing raids didn’t happen immediately, so the French people were unsuspecting 
of anything that would truly cause a fear for their own safety. “The people began to 
accommodate themselves to the situation,” as the, “need for evacuation had to be seen to be 
unnecessary,” (Diamond, 24-25). Furthering the argument that France relied heavily on 
defensive strategies, fortifications such as the Maginot Line were pivotal tactical points. The 
fortifications, “appeared vital; acting as a steel and concrete couverture, they would not only 
reinforce the army but would also provide the nation with sufficient time to mobilize all of its 
military establishment,” (Challener, 223). As some French military leaders did not take into 
account the advanced offensive technologies that Germany had invested in, the Maginot line and 
the Ardennes Forest were broken through in five days. Charles de Gaulle, however, insisted that, 
“The logic of the nation in arms would condemn France to wage an almost endless, grinding war 
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of attrition,” (Challener, 248). Charles de Gaulle also criticized the French military’s focus on 
building a mass army and not one that is necessarily well trained2. Not heeding advice from the 
arguably more progressive thinking de Gaulle, the French government continued to build on their 
defensive strategies. While the French had a planned system of evacuation, it did not take into 
account the rate at which the French Army’s fortifications would fall or the failure of their 
military strategies, as failure was not something a nation like France wanted to admit was an 
option. Thus, the altogether embarrassing defeat came as a shock to the French people and 
further contributed to the traumatic event that was the migration of 1940.  
 
Germany in Retreat 
Just after the Nazi defeat on the Eastern front line at Stalingrad, Russia in February 1943, the 
Germans experienced a long trek back west in a massive retreat that left many outlying German 
civilians to either stay and defend their city from the invading Russians or to flee. The decision 
to stay or flee was a confusing one to make, one self-preserving option with many supposed 
securities and one with a moral responsibility to protect, “greater Germany.” It’s worth 
mentioning here that if the case is true that a human’s first instinct is self-preservation and not 
self-sacrifice, there has to be at some level an outside indoctrination of ideals that allows the 
‘greater good’ to surpass the importance of self. Based on this assumption, references to 
Germany’s military history and theories of a ‘nation in arms’ are needed to solidify my assertion 
that Hitler’s military strategies and how he conducted civilian affairs is birthed from previous, 
glamorized German military victories and the Nazi nationalism that was created from this edited 
history. We can see this edited history throughout Hitler’s work, Mein Kampf, where he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Taken	  from	  Challener,	  Richard	  D.,	  The	  French	  Theory	  of	  the	  Nation	  in	  Arms	  (1866-­1939)	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1955)	  pp.	  248-­‐249.	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discusses the underlying reasons for his country’s financial burdens and the defeat of WWI, the 
Jewish people. Hitler’s past experiences as a soldier for Germany in WWI and the personal 
implications of such a defeat, including the loss of camaraderie and the realities of German 
defeat which fueled him to pursue community with others like-minded, and then power, in 
politics. It can be said that Hitler’s private motivations were easily aligned with the Nazi Party’s 
racist, socialist agenda. The two became inseparable. As Hitler rose to become the Fuhrer of the 
National Socialist Party, he wanted it to be, “organized like a government itself so that when 
power was achieved and democracy was legitimately ended, this 'government in waiting' could 
slip right into place,” (Galvin). Alongside of the many bureaus that were established during the 
war, many government officials were elected to these positions and moved around given their 
allegiance to Hitler and to the Party. However, with these new officials and this new 
‘government,’ there was not a new constitution or any preparation for Nazi longevity. 
 
With new territorial expansions, Hitler would put into power a Gauleiter, or governor, who 
would have power over the “German” civilians in major regions and cities. In the case of Breslau 
and other “Fortress” cities, these governors facilitated the propaganda, press releases, and 
speeches being delivered from Hitler in Germany. Thus, communication was incredibly 
important between Hitler and his governors in the outer reaches of his empire.  
 
However, at the start of the great retreat in 1943 and the hasty approach of Allied forces 1944, 
Hitler grew more nervous and called for the implementation of the Volkstrum3. While using the 
Volkstrum units provided men for the German military to use, Hitler failed to provide adequate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Volkstrum	  is	  defined	  as,	  “the	  civilian	  population,	  alongside	  the	  Wehrmacht,	  [who]	  would	  defend	  ‘fortress’	  cities	  to	  the	  last	  drop	  of	  blood.”	  (Bessel,	  16).	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material support in the form of ammunition, weapons, and training resources. “Far from 
emanating strength, calling up old men and boys showed that the Reich was morally bankrupt,” 
(Hargreaves, 29). In Breslau specifically, the history of civilian soldiers can be seen most 
directly with the Mongol invasion of central Europe in 1241. Again referencing the edited 
history of Germany, according to the Nazis, “In the wake of the Mongol invasion, Third Reich 
histories proclaimed, ‘Breslau was built anew by German settlers as a German city and has 
remained so until present day,” (Hargreaves, 11). So, with the ill-equipped Volkstrum in use in 
‘fortress’ cities that are about to be engulfed by the encroaching Red Army and experiencing 
embarrassing defeats there, Hitler orders for the bridges over the Oder River to be blown. This 
effectively isolates those German civilians that are east of that river and makes them incredibly 
defenseless against the Russian ‘Mongols.’ This lack of concern for his people is further 
illustrated in Hitler’s failure to provide adequate means of transportation for the fleeing German 
civilians from Breslau. “Wehremacht leadership did not pay any care for civilians as well as their 
soldiers,” (Bessel, 35). The mention of ‘soldiers’ here serves to highlight the reality of German 
military units began to retreat with the civilians during January and February 1945. However, 
should a soldier be caught without his unit and he was not on his way to meet up with his unit, he 
would be shot for desertion.  
 
 
Similarities and Differences 
Similarities between the French and German military strategies include the usage of the Loire 
and Oder Rivers as natural defensive fortifications from the respective invading forces. The key 
importance of war history and the enculturation and perpetuation of that collective memory is 
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also prevalent in both cases, shown in the references to the Franco-Prussian War, WWI for 
France, and the Mongol invasion of 1241 for Germany. During their respective retreats, both 
militaries became unorganized and it was not unusual to find soldiers intermixing with civilians 
who were fleeing. The German soldiers, however, were killed by firing squad if they were 
suspected of desertion, which happened frequently (Bessel, 63). 
 
Differences simply include the structure of the respective militaries in regards to official 
positions, the type of military strategy used at the start of the war and how it shifted once on the 
retreat, and lastly the rate at which the two militaries prepared for war, industrially. These 
differences proved to be crucial when regarding the causes of the two migrations, as it is because 
of these differences that the two migrations are so distinct from one another when they are both 
essentially the same experience.  
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 
By approaching the political motivations of the failing French Third Republic and bolstering 
National Socialist Party in Germany, it is beneficial to take into consideration the historical 
events that take place before the civilian migrations so as to understand the foundations that were 
laid for the ever present political complexities that existed during that time of chaos. By 
understanding the historical foundations, such as the political sentiment that developed from the 
First World War, it is possible then to move onto the internal organization of power within each 
political institution and see how each level of organization had its particular importance to the 
main goal of each regime. Consequentially, upon deciphering the many political orders issued to 
civilians before, during, and after the respective exoduses, there is space to fill in the history with 
the underlying social tensions and norms that existed as a launch pad for various orders to be 
executed.  
 
With the arrival of 1931, the French Third Republic experienced the economically devastating 
effects of the Great Depression, which helped lead France towards political instability. Concern 
over Germany’s election of Adolf Hitler just two years later in 1933 aided this political upheaval 
in France, as right-wing movements sought to take control of the weakened but consolidated, 
left-wing, Third Republic in the 1936 formation of the Front Populaire. Through the back and 
forth uncertainty of Leon Blum’s Leftist government in the midst of Anti-Semitic rightist parties, 
“there can be no doubt that in 1939 the French people went to war with a listless reluctance that 
in no way resembled the spirit of any previous generation,” (Challener, 220). As Germany is 
recovering from debilitating sanctions imposed on them by the Allied powers’ Treaty of 
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Versailles and the devastating Depression, there existed a power vacuum within the German 
political party system. When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he was not met with 
tremendous support from the German people, “[as] only five years before [1933], just one in 
every hundred Breslauers had supported the National Socialists,” (Hargreaves, 15). However, 
with the devastation of the economic crises of the 1920’s and early 1930’s, many voted for the 
National Socialist party and their promises of economic recovery. Both societies arguably 
experienced similar feelings of uneasiness and unpreparedness of what was to come from not 
only their representative governments, but also World War II as a whole.  
 
Politics of the Third Republic 
Within the mid-1930’s, France began to slowly increase military spending and extending 
conscriptions from one-year requirements to two years of mandatory service. However, the 
military ideology rested firmly on their Eastern defensive fortifications, such as the Maginot Line 
(Challener, 224). To the frustration of Colonel Charles de Gaulle, Leon Blum refuted any 
proposition that would enhance the French military offensive force with a professional army, as 
any monetary spending should rest on improving internal economy and the tradition of a ‘nation 
in arms.’ To explore further the reasons behind Leon Blum’s refusal to support the contemporary 
notion of a professional army and a mechanized military force, we must look at the internal 
dynamics of the Third Republic system of government. Specifically, we must observe the 
organization of power within the structure, the existing Anti-Semitic sentiments, and the people’s 
perception of their government leading up to and during the massive exodus out of northern 
France.  
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Leon Blum came into power with the Popular Front, a coalition of left-wing parties such as the 
Communist Party, Socialist Party, and Radical Party, after the Great Depression when France 
was experiencing frequent changeovers between political parties. Blum’s socialist party 
developed reforms such as the forty-hour workweek, restructuring banks, and an annual two-
week’s paid leave for workers, among many more. It’s worth noting that this vacation time 
allowed for internal tourism to take place in France, opening up beautiful beaches and resorts 
that were once held for the French elite, to the public. This signaled a shift in behavior between 
social classes and a resentment that would be present in the conforming of all social classes 
together on the roads during the massive exodus, written about in Irene Némirovsky’s novel, 
Suite Francaise. After Blum’s resignation and the Front Populaire’s collapse, a new government 
began to take shape. In April of 1938, what was left of the Front swayed significantly to the right 
as Daladier’s signing of the Munich Pact and a virtual break from the Front’s leftist traditions 
and reforms, led to the over emphasis of the defensive military strategy and false hope that 
Germany wouldn’t attack France through the ‘impassible’ Maginot line (Whitman). “The 
political Left, drawing its conclusions from nonmilitary reasoning, tied a host of political, 
economic, and psychological factors into the popular concept of the nation in arms and made it a 
stereotype,” (Challener, 256). All of this government history has been presented here, I would 
argue, to provide a basis for government hesitation in preventative action when detailing orders 
to Frenchmen and women about fleeing Paris, a French fortress city. Indicatively, politicians and 
military strategists of the post-1918 era believed that France itself was a fortress behind the 
Maginot Line and its ‘nation in arms.’ “Whereas the general theory of the nation in arms led to 
no set military form, the particular post-1918 theory led to the creation of an inadequate military 
form and provided a rationale to preserve the status quo,” (Challener, 256). This is again why the 
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invasion of France and the need for rapid evacuation was unforeseen and shocking; no one was 
prepared for it because no one wanted to believe it could actually happen.  
 
The uncertainty and short-sightedness that plagued the government actors in France leading up to 
May of 1940 was reflected in its people, as many prepared for imminent invasion after the 
declaration of war, but only came to a nine-month long waiting period known as the Phony War. 
During this time, Germany’s military gained many victories and surprised the French with their 
swift advances, but even this was not enough to warn the French people. “The French 
propaganda machine kept the full extent of the [French] army’s collapse out of the public 
domain, so most were able to pass off this apparently ‘temporary’ success for the Germans as a 
consequence of their superior military force…and their willingness to resort to cruelty and 
uncivilized methods,” (Diamond, 8). The French government, specifically Prime minister Paul 
Reynaud, would even play off of Germany’s previous invasions of France and use it to comfort 
the French people, by saying, “France has been invaded a hundred times and never beaten…our 
belief in victory is intact,” (Diamond, 8). Government propaganda sought to not only reaffirm 
the French identity in the ‘nation in arms’ to its people, but also to its government officials 
themselves. Propaganda also had a double affect, one of instilling fear into the French civilians 
who read newspapers and listen to radio correspondences, and keeping alive the German 
‘atrocities’ that existed during the French invasion during the First World War. Northern 
Frenchmen and Belgians that were passing through Paris would bring stories of the 
“viciousness,” of the German soldier (Diamond, 12). The French people were also very aware 
through magazines and headlines of new bombing techniques, as shown in the Spanish Civil 
War, so there was constant fear of German air raids (Diamond, 9). 
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Alongside of propaganda and these socially facilitated fears, what political orders or 
communications sparked the massive migration of people from northern France and how did the 
government relay pertinent information to its civilians? This is an interesting question to discuss, 
as the Third Republic had already established various agencies and businesses that would 
mobilize in a defensive strategy should France be in a time of crisis, as before mentioned. 
According to Hannah Diamond, the mobilization plan established by the French government, 
mentioned on page 11 of this work, ended up being uncoordinated and clumsy in execution. 
“The government struggled to balance the manpower needs of the military with what was 
required to keep the essential war industries going. At first the number of men exempted from 
mobilization and allocated the status of specially designated worker was overestimated,” 
(Diamond, 16). These men were sent to factories in Paris, which would have a sizable affect on 
the evacuation movement of people through the city. With the declaration of war on Germany on 
September 3, 1939, Daladier immediately began to build up the prowess of the Maginot 
defensive line, but when the Maginot line fell embarrassingly quickly, Daladier resigned from 
his post on March 20, 1940 and allowed for his successor, Paul Reynaud, to take control of the 
crumbling government (Whitman). In the midst of the fall of the Maginot line, we see a French 
public who accepted the myth that the Maginot line was impenetrable and then was suddenly 
affronted by the reality in which they now lived, which naturally leads to uncertainty and panic. 
This naivety was reflected in the politicians’ view of air invasion, as many of the senate 
remembered the Allied forces’, “superiority in the air,” and thought that the Second World War 
would be fought in similar fashion to WWI (Diamond, 18). It is interesting to note that, 
“suggestions that the evacuation of large numbers of people might be necessary were simply 
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dismissed as a defeatist position, out of line with the aura of confidence that surrounded all 
planning for the impending hostilities,” (Diamond, 18). This supports the claim that the level of 
honest communication between the government existed in a cloud of uncertainty, masked with 
the false pretenses of propaganda and their memory of past wars. The safety of France’s people 
was simply not a serious concern at the time, as departements4 were notified of the amount of 
allotted refugees that were to be temporarily housed there (Diamond, 18). However, these plans 
that the government had made to support an exodus did not take into account the density of 
transportation from these northern departements and the inability to support a large amount of 
civilian migrants. Much of the evacuation plans were directed towards the people nearest to the 
battle front by the Maginot line, so large interior cities were not as prepared as some others for 
evacuation. For those who evacuated, “under the official plans [established by the government] 
and...went to their allocated department,” received benefits, such as monetary stipends. Upon the 
declaration of war in 1939, 550,000 Parisians left the city, but it was only a fraction of people 
that were there (Diamond, 23-24).  
 
While official measures were taken to prepare the French for evacuation, the measurement of 
how many civilians would actually be evacuating was severely undershot. I assert that this 
failure in the French Third Republic’s ability to plan for such an evacuation was hindered by its 
collective dismissal of modern warfare, as it had adapted and mechanized since WWI, and its 
inclination to rely on its past victories and theory of a ‘nation in arms’. For the French, the real 
test of infrastructure and government radio addresses would come after the Phony War’s end in 
May of 1940. However, by dissecting the political changes and theories that accompanied 
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  Departement	  is	  a	  French	  term	  for	  “county”	  or	  “territorial	  division”	  within	  the	  country.	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wartime events over the decade before the declaration of war in 1939, we are now able to look at 
the motives and reactions of the migrating, French civilians to their government’s actions more 
accurately and critically.  
 
The Nazi Party Culture 
As the exodus from Breslau in eastern Germany occurs in 1945, less emphasis will be placed on 
the political events that gave rise to Hitler’s Chancellorship in the early 1930’s, but will be 
placed on the shift of his political ideology from the height of the regime’s power to its rapid 
demise near the end of WWII. Specifically, government ordinances and flows of power to the 
outer reaches of the expanding German empire will be looked at more so than those of the 
interior. Geographically, Breslau is located in Silesia (or modern-day Poland) and has its roots in 
history as a ‘fortress city’ dating back to 1241. It is seen as a historically ‘German’ city that was 
birthed out of its defiance of Mongol invasion (Hargreaves, 11). It gradually became a key 
trading center, “between East and west, and goods from the Netherlands, Hungary, Russia, 
southern Germany, Prussia, and Poland were exchanged at its markets, [thus earning] the 
trappings of a great city and gained the title die Blume Europas- the flower of Europe,” 
(Hargreaves, 11). Because of its early history for defense, which lined up with Hitler’s political 
and military ideology, and its geo-strategically prodigious location, Breslau became a key focal 
point in Hitler’s conquest of the East. This celebrated history of Brelsau’s fortitude and revolt 
against Mongol later Napoleonic invaders was proliferated by Third Reich historians and 
propagandists in Silesia. Economically, as an incredibly productive industrial town, Breslau and 
its surrounding region became Germany’s key economic supplier of resources such as coal, 
during the critical stages of the Industrial Revolution. However, after the breakup of the German 
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Empire, the Polish majority of the Silesian population wanted to rejoin the, “reborn Polish state,” 
after WWI (Hargreaves, 13-14). With this social partition of Germans and Poles within the 
region and the economic disaster of the Depression, Breslau was in a state of desolation as a once 
economic and socially affluent area became poor. Only because of this economic situation and 
with Hitler’s promise of German rehabilitation, many Breslauers voted to support the National 
Socialist Party in 1933.  
 
The organization of government during the height of the Nazi regime in Breslau took no strictly 
organized form, but only placed Nazi government officials as head of various departments within 
the whole of the regime. “There was a myriad of high-ranking individual offices, government 
departments, ministries, agencies, and security forces- but there was no Nazi constitution or no 
clear framework or division of powers…there seemed to be no long-term planning,” (Llewellyn). 
One of these high-ranking government officials, Karl Hanke, was assigned to be the Gauliter5 of 
Breslau. Once the Nazi Party had won the governmental race in 1933, “the Nazis set about 
putting their stamp on the city immediately. Civic posts, such as the regional president and 
mayors, were quickly filled with Party members,” (Hargreaves, 15). Within the city, smaller 
offices, such as an office of Propaganda, were established to be extensions of the larger Nazi 
system. Loud speakers were set up all around the city, so Germans could hear their Chancellor’s 
speeches and decrees. Up until the middle of WWII, Breslau was a vibrant destination city 
within the Nazi Empire, seen as the Aryan intellectual and social epicenter of Eastern Germany. 
What with its roughly 10,000 strong Jewish population being rapidly deported from the city 
around 1938, it became the ‘ideal’ destination city for Nazi government officials to vacation to. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gauliter:	  Defined	  as	  a	  “district	  leader	  in	  Nazi	  Germany	  who	  served	  as	  a	  provincial	  governor.	  Gau-­‐	  “Party	  district”	  and	  Liter-­‐	  “leader”	  (Merriam-­‐Webster	  Dictionary)	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This elimination of the Jewish population in regions like Silesia was a part of the “General Plan 
East [sought to reorganize] eastern Europe and western Soviet Union [where the goal was to] 
eliminate 30 million or more Slavs and the settlement of their territories by German overlords 
who would control and eventually repopulate the area with Germans,” (“Germany”). 
 
Taking a closer look into the government’s actions surrounding the ‘turn’ of WWII, where 
Russian forces launched their offensive and sent Germany on a quick retreat back westward, it is 
clear to see how the Nazi government in Breslau prepared or did not prepare for the evacuation 
of German civilians there. The sting of German defeat at Stalingrad in 1943 signaled concern for 
the German offensive strategy for Hitler (“Germany”). Hanke and other Gauliters were ordered 
by the central offices to build up fortifications of Breslau, which in most cases civilians of 
Breslau and migrant workers from regions newly conquered by the Germans in the east, 
(Hargreaves, 27). These fortifications did not hold up to the Allied forces air raid on October 7, 
1944, where Breslau was faced with its first major, physiologically personal even, attack of 
WWII (Hargreaves, 28). Upon this attack, Hanke addressed the city of over 100,000 Breslauers 
and called for a movement of civilians to rise up and become the ‘citizen-soldiers’ of Germany, 
the Volksstrum (Hargreaves, 29). These last chance efforts issued by Nazi government leaders 
and propagandists reflect how unorganized their structure of government actually was when 
plans needed to be established for the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people from 
Silesia. In fact, only when physically seeing the Russian invading forces in the distance, almost 
surrounding Breslau, did government give the official decree through loudspeaker:  
 “The civilian populace must evacuate every district of Breslau 
 east of the Oder immediately. The Oder bridges in the city are  
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 being prepared for demolition by engineers. Every inhabitant  
 in the eastern part of town must leave his house immediately 
 and proceed on foot to the western side of the city where 
 every step has been taken to prepare for arrival,” (Hargreaves, 
 73). 
Knowing that this effort had not entirely taken place and that western Breslau could not hold 
these refugees, the head of the Propaganda office’s deputy, Carl Wichmann, declared that, “at 
such times, the fate of individuals does not matter,” (Hargreaves, 73). 
 
Let this serve to indicate the lack of planning by the Nazi government to provide expedient and 
safe routes to safety for evacuating German people from Breslau. This lack of planning and 
infrastructure to support the mass exodus is emblematic in other regions of Silesia as well. I 
assert that this failure to plan for such a massive, decidedly lethal event is found in the German 
prevailing political ideology, or Nazism, which crippled itself under the weight of propaganda 
and a lack of organizational structure within its government.  
 
Similarities and Differences 
While both political entities, the Third Republic and Third Reich, failed to deliver a cohesive and 
organized plan of evacuation due to their respective ideologies, which in fact blinded them to the 
realities of invading forces; I assert that their specific situations differ in relation to their 
ideologies. The French government relied on their past experiences and victorious military 
strategies of the Franco-Prussian War and WWI to determine how to prepare for WWII, 
mistaking it to be fought in a similar style like that of WWI. With investing in defensive 
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strategies and weaponry specifically designed to fortify such a defensive political stance, France 
was left in shock when fortifications like these and the Maginot Line failed almost immediately 
and their “fortress city” Paris was occupied by the invading Germans. They failed, not because 
of a lack of military preparedness, but in strategic preparedness and psychological preparedness. 
In this way, the Third Republic’s demise resembles the Third Reich’s demise. The failure in 
Breslau by the Third Reich was not one of military strategy per se. It was more so the regime 
being blinded by their own ideology, their belief that Germany would prevail and its perfect race 
would ultimately achieve European Hegemony. Due to fear and other implications, members of 
the government and the people themselves could not and would not entertain the idea of defeat or 
withdrawing from advancing Russian forces. The Third Reich’s impressive dedication, 
understated here of course, to their core values was also reflected in the French’s political 
ideology- a heavy emphasis on historical achievements of their ancestors and that same 
achievement being bred into every Frenchmen or German. Upon discussing hindering ideologies, 
these two regimes are similar in this way as well. However, where the Nazi Regime and the 
Third Republic differ is in their commitment to its people, those evacuating their regions headed 
westward in the case of Breslauers and southwards in the case of many Parisians. The social 
implications of this lack of leadership are reflected in the evacuees’ memoirs and firsthand 
accounts of their respective exoduses, which I will discuss in greater detail in the following 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
In a dramatic movement of peoples from one homeland to the next, there will naturally be 
tension. A resistance to change in ideologies, cultural climate, and concessions made to make 
room for migrant people. This tension manifests itself in unspoken gestures, like a cold shoulder, 
a closed door, or a sign with a bold phrase painted across it, and in spoken word. In passing a 
“comrade” in the street while on your way to work, a hissed derogatory slur hits your ear like a 
drop of water to a simmering pan as the comrade strides by. You’re unwelcome in every place 
you move to. “Where have you come from?” is a question that needs no answering, as it is 
apparent that wherever that place is, is not true Germany. That’s all that matters. In France, every 
Frenchmen is on the road together, fleeing Hitler’s occupation. You’re carrying all that you own 
in a wheelbarrow while your children wear as many layers of clothing as possible so to save 
space. Next to you passes an automobile carrying a woman and her most prized possessions. You 
see China and linens. People and things that have no place being in a massive march towards 
uncertainty. How can you prepare for something when you don’t even know what it looks like, 
or what it sounds like, or feels like? How will this end? With the already established military and 
political motivations and circumstances behind these two exoduses, we are now able to look at 
the firsthand accounts of the citizens who experienced these events firsthand. Through diary 
entries, public speeches, and daily interactions with one another, we are able to see these 
exoduses through the eyes of the people who experienced it themselves. It is then clear to see just 
how fearful these people were about being invaded and occupied, how they viewed one another 
ethnically, and how they respond to the realization that the government is in fact not in control of 
these exoduses as one would have previously been led to believe.  
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Demographics of Migration 
Within both migrations, French and Germanic, there exists the mixing of different ethnic groups 
and social classes that produces tension and stress. Through novels like Suite Francaise by Irene 
Nemirovsky, the reader metaphorically taken through the roads and travels shoulder to shoulder 
with the migrating Parisians. Each Parisian in the novel is from a different socio-economic and 
religious background. As this novel is a historical fiction and not produced directly from specific 
people’s stories, I assert that this perspective is critical to seeing the personal side of this 
traumatic uprooting of millions of people. As a researcher, it is one thing to see facts and figures 
and make sense of this movement in a scholarly way and it is absolutely possible to not be 
impacted by these findings in any way possible. It is an entirely different thing altogether, 
however, to have the opportunity to not only see the figures and magnitude of the migration of 
1940 in an empirical light, but to also experience the migration as close as one can while being 
separated from it by seventy years’ time. It is therefore extremely valuable to pair Nemirovsky’s 
drawn perspectives to diary entries of real French men and women and to see where the 
matching themes lie.  
 
Within the French migration, there are various nationalities, different religions, and different 
socio-economic demographics present. In light of the German invasion of Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in May 1940, people of those nationalities who could flee 
southwest though the northern part of France and down towards Paris and onward to the Free 
Zone, took everything they had and tried to catch any mode of transportation that was available. 
“No one anticipated the enormous number of refugees that flooded into France. Most simply 
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wanted to escape the bombs,” (Diamond, 29). Interestingly enough, while these people were of 
different nationality from one another, French and Dutch, Belgian, etc., there grew a suspicion 
amongst those fleeing that they could not trust the person in step next to them, even though they 
were fleeing the same German Army.  
 
Modes of transportation quickly became increasingly difficult to use or come by, as petrol for 
vehicles could not easily be found on the roads headed southward and trains were only able to 
carry so many people at one time. Then the issue exists of where to go if you don’t have any 
family to stay with? Conditions on the roads were perilous, not only due to the impending 
German air attacks, but also due to the lack of food, lack of shelter as inns were filled nightly or 
there wasn’t enough space or money to pay for a room, and the growing tension that comes with 
desperate times (Diamond, 67). Theft became a serious issue on the roads. People were in real 
danger of being stolen from in the night or while their possessions were momentarily left 
unattended. Petrol was siphoned from other vehicles’ gas tanks. People were taken advantage of 
when the social structure collapsed in the midst of a chaotic event such as this exodus (Diamond, 
75).  
 
Upon discussing the demographics of the German migration of 1945, the majority of the people 
departing through Breslau are not only Germans from the city, but also Germans from 
neighboring countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria to name a few. 
These people were all fleeing the invading Russian Red Army. With ethnic Germans moving 
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from one location to another within 3 years (1942-1945, with the expansion of Germany), a 
sense of home or “heimat6” was not established, leaving German people with a loss of identity.  
 
View Towards Occupation and Invasion 
In France, the Fifth Column became one of the major factors that contributed to the heightened 
fear and animosity towards other people within the exoduses. French government officials define 
the Fifth Column as a movement that served to undermine French success in the War, making 
the Fifth Column “responsible7” for France’s defeat and hardships. Not only did propaganda 
facilitate and perpetuate the fear that defined the French morale, it was aided even further by 
historical Prussian invasions, dating back as recently as 1870 and 1918. A woman remembers her 
evacuation when she was 14 years old; “We left because we saw the others leaving and we were 
afraid of the Germans. My mother had lived through 1914-18 and was very afraid: ‘we can’t stay 
here’ ‘we can’t stay here’8,” (Diamond, 31). As stated in the previous chapters, war memory and 
the memory of the past German invasions play a haunting role in the fear that grew within the 
fleeing French people. “It was the presence of Allied soldiers (mostly French) caught up amongst 
the civilians which drew the Germans to bomb and machine-gun the columns of fleeing civilians. 
These soldiers and refugees on the open roads were easy targets, allowing the Germans to create 
panic with maximum effect,” (Diamond, 30). The German army knew full well the traditional 
connection to memory and history that French people have, and so they were able to use that in 
order to inflict the most fear. Similarly, the Russian Red Army did the same to the German 
civilians when the German Army was in retreat. With raping and pillaging newly captured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  heimat,	  according	  to	  the	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  is	  German	  for	  “home	  or	  homeland”	  7	  Taken	  from	  the	  French	  President,	  Reynaud’s	  declarations	  (Oxford	  University	  Press:	  New	  York,	  2007)	  pg.	  79.	  8	  Mme Asquin, interview with the author [Hannah Diamond] (Amiens, April 2005) pg. 31	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German towns, Russians left their mark as ruthless ‘Mongols.’ With this reputation, “and the 
Russians at the gates, the civilian population [of East Prussia] did not wait for orders: ‘Almost 
nowhere did a timely and organized evacuation take place, on the contrary the departure of the 
East Prussian population constituted a disorderly flight which was triggered at the last moment 
and which was completely chaotic,” (Bessel, 73).  Thus, with stories like that of the appalling 
desecration of the city of Nemmersdorf in October 1944 by the Red Army, news and propaganda 
posters of Russia’s mutilation of Germans spread like wildfire across the German Empire, 
spurring on a new fear of invasion and occupation.  
  
Similarities and Differences 
These migrations catalyzed already present ethnic and social tensions within both societies. They 
also made each society question their own government’s motivations, capabilities, and 
underlying agendas while in the midst of WWII. In regards to the two governments’ preparations 
for an event such as a migration of millions of people, the hitch rests in the fact that neither of 
the two nations considered that to be proactive, instead it was considered weak. “Suggestions 
that the evacuation of large numbers of people might be necessary were simply dismissed as a 
defeatist position, out of line with the aura of confidence that surrounded all planning for the 
impending hostilities,” (Diamond, 18). People began to lose confidence in their governments 
once they realized that there would be no concessions to aid their current situation, or I should 
say, when there is impending defeat approaching rapidly. The differences fall where the issue of 
preparation is concerned. On both accounts, the building up of infrastructure would have been 
necessary in order to have been better able to conduct the flow of people to the southern part of 
France and the Western parts of the then German Empire. Even in this statement it is worth 
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noting that the distances of which the Germans had to travel in comparison to the French people 
are arguably much greater on average, as minority Germans in the far East had to cross multiple 
countries in order to get to a safe zone, whereas a vast majority of the French stayed in France. 
“In the capital, the police distributed tracts recommending people make their own arrangements 
to leave immediately in the event of air attack. They were urged to go to country homes or to 
find accommodation with extended family. In 1940 many city dwellers were only one generation 
removed from the country side. Relatively recent urbanization meant that most Parisian families 
still had relatives in the provinces,” (Diamond, 23). This provides a sense of security that many 
people in Germany did not have, as their removal from heimat proved to be detrimental to the 
identification of “home.” In addition to the distance disparity, there exists the incredibly weighty 
factor of climate. The French migration occurred in May of 1940, which did prove to be 
‘unbearably’ hot and did cause some deaths from dehydration and exposure to the elements 
while on the roads. However, the German migration occurred in February of 1945, which caused 
many Germans to flee quickly in the dead of winter. Exposure to the elements caused people to 
literally freeze to death. The death rate is estimated to be one of 500,000 to 600,000 people total, 
including foreign workers and civilians who died while fleeing in Germany and the death rate in 
France is estimated to be 100,000 among refugees (Diamond, 143).  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Findings and Applications 
Two peoples of differing ideologies, political agendas, and social constructions are put in 
frighteningly similar conditions and are left with dramatically different results. The goal with this 
research is to find the link between the social or cultural structure of a society and the political 
agendas of regimes and in so doing, prove how this relationship is imperative to determining the 
success or failure of mobilizing a people during chaotic environments. My hope would be that 
this research could then be applied to current wartime refugee evacuation trauma, such as the 
crisis in Syria. Alan Ball writes that, “Life is infinitely complex, and I feel like we live in a 
culture that really seems to simplify it into sound bites and bromides, and that does not work.” 
 
In this research, it would be easy to simplify actors in these migrations. For example, not all 
Germans supported Hitler. In fact, many citizens did not share in his ideology, just enjoyed the 
economic and nationalistic benefits of the Nazi state for a short while. So to say that all Germans 
were Nazis is a falsity. Loaded words such as “Nazi” and “Allied Power” that only suffice in a 
simple history fail to accurately describe events surrounding WWII, specifically the exoduses. 
When starting this research I have to constantly remind myself of this, as this research is 
challenging my own preconceived notions of history. There aren’t set themes that outline the 
causes and effects of each wartime migration around the world. There are impeccable similarities 
between the French and German migrations, but apparent differences due to unique memories of 
war.  
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Can you be a powerful nation economically and politically and prepare their infrastructure for a 
massive displacement of people? Through this research I have concluded that a nation could 
prepare infrastructure for wartime chaos, much like America did with our highway system during 
the Cold War, but I do not believe that a powerful hegemonic nation will. In today’s politics it is 
very much oriented to the image of a nation. How strong to you portray yourself to be, or how 
strategic are you about getting other nations to ally with you to cover your debt or military 
shortcomings. Should a hegemonic power be preparing for a possible defeat if there is an 
uprising challenging nation who could easily take military or economic hegemony away from 
said current world leader? As a civilian who would be experiencing these chaotic events 
firsthand, I would be supportive of such an investment into our infrastructure. However, as an 
American with an investment in our international image and current status as the hegemonic 
power, I see the benefits of maintaining that image of being powerful and unwilling to even 
consider defeat. This issue is one that should be pursued further and I value these moments in 
history that truly allow us to look at something so unchanging as the human instinct to protect 
itself but place it in the context of time, enculturation, and war. These moments will continue to 
reveal more to the current generation of leaders about the human inclinations and desires from 
their governments during chaos.
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